Kevin Doremus: Ukraine should be careful what she asks for

Kevin Doremus is an instructor in international relations, Russian foreign policy, and world civilization at LCC International University in Klaipėda, Lithuania.

Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskiy has placed himself between a rock and a hard place. The stalled conflict in the Donbas, which Great Powers Journal has been reporting on, is escalating as both Russia and Ukraine mobilize their forces. President Zelenskiy is now calling on NATO to fast-track Ukraine’s membership, which he says “is the only way to end the war in Donbas.” As I hope to lay out, this move is a mistake and could leave Ukraine to the same fate as Georgia.

When looking at both the Russian-Georgian war and the beginnings of the Ukraine crisis, the logic of Russia’s responses fits within a realist view of international politics. John Mearsheimer’s Tragedy of Great Power Politics argues that as states grow powerful, they will try to become regional hegemons. Following this logic, “powerful states attempt to influence and constrain the behaviour of smaller neighbours.” Other realists like Robert Jervis expand on this idea, arguing that “in order to protect themselves, states seek to control, or at least neutralize, areas on their borders.”

The reasoning for why states pursue regional hegemony or dominance is assumed to be due to four conditions that exist in international politics. Elias Götz summarizes these conditions as:

1. The international system is anarchic (there is no global police force or world government)
2. Nation-states face security dilemmas (“can never be certain about each other’s intentions”)
3. Because the world is anarchic, states pursue policies to ensure their survival
4. Because geography makes it difficult to achieve global dominance, a state’s power projection declines over distance

This means that regional actors become nervous when another powerful actor enters their sphere. The fear is “that a peer competitor might jeopardize their hegemony by upsetting the balance of power in their backyard.” President Zelenskiy should understand that powers like Russia, the USA, and China will act if their neighbors partner with a rival. The United States did not tolerate the Soviet Union’s presence in Cuba, and Russia would not allow Georgia to become a NATO member.

Some might note that Russia did not use military force to prevent the Baltic states from joining NATO. This is true, but Russia always opposed NATO expansion – her state capacity simply prevented her from responding at the time. Götz notes that when the Baltic States joined NATO, Russia lacked the funds for her war machine. While Russia faced an economic recession following the end of the Soviet Union, she also faced a political crisis when Chechnya and Tatarstan attempted to set up independent state-like structures. It was less that Russia allowed the Baltic states to join NATO and more that Russia could not effectively respond to international events.

The situation today is much different, as Russia has rebuilt herself into a significant international player.  As her war with Georgia, intervention in Syria, and private military contractor deployments to Africa demonstrate, Russian grand strategic-goals include obtaining status and recognition from states like the US and returning to great-power status in global affairs. Constructivist & neoclassical realist authors also note that Russian elites encourage assertiveness abroad to divert the Russian population’s attention from internal issues. Russia has to appear strong not only to the world but also to her people in order to maintain domestic legitimacy. As Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes note, Russian policy is “driven largely by its leadership’s deep anxiety about the country’s domestic weaknesses. Russia is bereft of soft power, its economy is uncompetitive, its petrodollar-subsidized living standards are plummeting, and its population is aging and dwindling.”

Stephen Walt argues that Putin’s strategy is short-term, as “he is fighting a series of rearguard actions designed to prevent Russia’s global position from deteriorating further, instead of pursuing a program that might enhance Russia’s power and status over the longer term.”

Thus the stage is set. As a regional power, Russia does not want a peer competitor in her sphere. She needs to look strong for her domestic audience, or else she will lose domestic legitimacy. Like Zelenskiy, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili pursued a pro-Western foreign policy, with one of the objectives being to join NATO. Simultaneously, the US has allowed Turkey to establish her sphere of influence over the Caucasus states (including Georgia). As Emmanuel Karagiannis notes, “the USA hoped that Turkey, together with some pro-Western former Soviet republics, would keep Russia in check.” However, once Turkey began to establish more friendly relations with Russia, the US felt compelled to enter the Caucasus “in order to prevent the revival of Russian hegemony.” This shifted the balance of power in the region and bolstered Russia’s assertiveness.

This is why Ukraine is trapped. Like Georgia, she believes that being part of NATO is her way to ensure her survival and protection from Russia. In 2007, Georgia committed about 2,000 soldiers to help with US-led operations in Iraq. Cpl. Georgi Zedguidze told The New York Times that “as soldiers here, we help the American soldiers...Then America as a country will help our country.” This assumption that the US fully supported Georgia led to a political miscalculation by Saakashvili. And attempts to reintegrate the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia led to the idea that a war could be a win-win situation. As Karagiannis notes:

“If the Kremlin did not respond to Georgian attacks, then the Saakashvili Government would have achieved the forcible reintegration of South Ossetia into Georgia; if the Russian army launched a counterattack (as it finally did), it would have been subject to accusations of invading a small pro-Western country and this could have led to either full NATO membership and/or new negotiations between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali.”

Ukrainian officials must not fall into the same trap as their Georgian counterparts did. As much as America talks about expanding her sphere, she will not risk war with Russia. Georgia is still not part of NATO, and the separatists in the Donbas remain active. Sending armored forces to the edge of the ceasefire zone will naturally provoke a Russian response. Russia has warned that if fierce fighting resumes, she will be forced to intervene with the stated goal of protecting civilians.

If Russia believes that the Donbas republics might be overwhelmed by Ukrainian forces, she would respond to guarantee their security. Additionally, Donetsk People's Republic leader Denis Pushilin said that there would be a counter-attack if the Donbas republics repulse Ukraine. In either case, Russia might retake lost ground or take even more territory from Ukraine.

As much as it makes sense for Ukraine to want to be part of NATO to ensure her security, she must consider how other NATO members perceive events. Dr. Sumantra Marita says that “NATO isn't a protection racket. It's an alliance [based] on shared interests, and the interests of Britain aren't the same as the ones of Ukraine.” Doug Bandow says in The American Conservative that “bringing in a member already involved in a conflict with Russia, which might require nuclear weapons for its defense, is simply not in America’s interest.” Even Western news outlets such as Sky News write that “Ukraine's leader Volodymyr Zelensky may clamour for fast-track NATO membership but he will not get it."

Ukraine must understand her position in the international system. She is a buffer between the US-bounded liberal order and the Russian sphere of influence. Zelenskiy has received pro forma statements of support, but he must avoid interpreting them as a commitment to back Ukraine in a war. If this miscommunication happens as it did with Georgia, Zelenskiy will pay a heavy price. It may sound cruel to Ukrainians who want to orient towards Western liberal institutions, but such is the tragedy of international politics.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent those of Great Powers Journal. However, we endorse it as a valuable contribution to the conversation.